Industry: Government and Public Sector Product: ModelRisk Application: Disaster recovery
The disaster has already struck. Roads, public housing, water systems, schools and the power grid are damaged, a federal declaration is in place, and the legislature wants two numbers: how much will the state pay to rebuild, and when will service be restored? The recovery plan answers with a single point estimate built from average damage counts and average unit costs: roughly $150M net of federal aid, restored in two years. Both numbers are medians dressed up as commitments — and both have a large chance of being wrong on the expensive side.
Simulating the rebuild 60,000 times, the median net state cost is indeed about $151M, but the distribution is heavily right-skewed: the mean is $184M and the 90th percentile is $342M — more than double the headline. There is a 19.9% chance the bill exceeds the $260M appropriation. The schedule is worse against its target: the median restoration takes 33 months and there is a 38.4% chance of breaching the 36-month statutory deadline.
A state emergency-management agency rebuilt its recovery appropriation and schedule case in ModelRisk after a prior event came in 60% over its authorized fund and a year past its deadline. The mandate: attach an honest probability to the budget and the timeline — and to the risk of missing both at once.
The deterministic plan multiplies an average damaged-asset count by an average unit cost and sums an average duration per category. That arithmetic is wrong in three structurally important ways:
The model draws one declared disaster per realization: severity-scaled Poisson damage counts across five asset categories, LogNormal unit rebuild costs under a shared escalation factor, Triangular restoration durations on a contractor-contention critical path, and a Beta-distributed federal cost share (around 75%) that itself is uncertain at planning time.
The joint view is the one a separate budget memo and schedule memo can never produce. Plotting net cost against restoration time, the probability of overrunning the appropriation AND the deadline at the same time is 11.9% — against only 7.6% if the two were independent. The shared event-severity and contractor-contention factors inflate the double-overrun corner by more than half. The realistic planning question is not "will we be over budget?" or "will we be late?" but the 46.4% chance of being over on at least one — and the one-in-eight chance of explaining both to the legislature in the same hearing.
The restoration S-curve converts the schedule uncertainty into a completion-probability date. There is a 10% chance of finishing within 23 months, a 50% chance by 33 months, and a 90%-confidence date of 47 months — fully two years beyond the optimistic deterministic plan. Against the 36-month statutory deadline the curve crosses at roughly the 62nd percentile, which is the same 38% breach probability seen from the cost side. A plan that commits to the deterministic finish date is committing to a date the simulation only reaches about one time in three.
Around the P90 net cost of $342M, the dominant driver is the event-severity factor — the extent of damage — followed by the federal/aid cost share and the cost-escalation factor. Because the aid share is the second-largest lever, the agency's net exposure is acutely sensitive to how much of the bill Washington ultimately covers: a less generous share than the planning assumption can move the net appropriation need by over $100M. Unit-cost dispersion and the Poisson damage counts matter less; contractor contention drives the schedule more than the cost.
A recovery plan that quotes one cost and one date is a plan that will be wrong on the expensive side roughly half the time. ModelRisk is what shows that the honest answer is a budget at the P90 and a schedule with a confidence date attached — and that the worst case is the one where both fail at once.